

LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA

SEVENTY-FOURTH REPORT

ON

PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 SO AS TO RENDER ADMISSIBLE CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY WITNESSES BEFORE COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY AND OTHER STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

AUGUST 1978

Justice H. R. Khanna

D.O. No. F. 2(14)/78-L.C. CHAIRMAN LAW COMMISSION

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Shastri Bhavan, 7th Floor, 'A' Wing, New Delhi-110 001.

August 8, 1978.

My Dear Minister,

I forward herewith the Seventy-fourth Report of the Law Commission of India relating to the proposal to amend the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 so as to render admissible certain statements made by witnesses before Commissions of Inquiry and other statutory authorities. The opening paragraph of the Report will explain the circumstances under which the Commission took up this subject for consideration.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.)

(H. R. KHANNA)

Hon'ble Shri Shanti Bhushan, Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi-110 001.

- 1. The opinion of the Law Commission has been sought Subject maton the question as to whether a statement made by a person in ter of the proceedings before a Commission appointed under the Commis-Report. sions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (Act No. 60 of 1952) should be made admissible by an amendment of the Indian Evidence Act in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings if the said person (hereinafter referred to for sake of clarity as witness) is dead at the time of that trial. The Law Commission would express its views on the above question on general principles, excluding from consideration any particular Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act and any contemplated civil or criminal proceedings.
- 2. Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act and sections 6. Relevant sta-8B and 8C of the Commissions of Inquiry Act which have rele-tutory provivance read as under:

"Section 33 (of the Indian Evidence Act).—Evidence given Act and Commissions by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before any person of inquiry authorised by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of Act. proving, in a subsequent judicial proceeding or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable:

that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest;

that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine;

that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding.

Explanation.-A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor and the accused within the meaning of this section.

"Section 6 (of the Commissions of Inquiry Act).-No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement:

Provided that the statement-

- (a) is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or
 - (b) is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry".

"Section 8B (of the Commissions of Inquiry Act).-If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission,-

- (a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person; or
- (b) is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry,

the Commission shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence:

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached."

"Section 8C (of the Commissions of Inquiry Act).-The appropriate Government, every person referred to in section 8B and, with the permission of the Commission, any other person whose evidence is recorded by the Commission,-

- (a) may cross-examine a witness other than a witness produced by it or him;
 - (b) may address the Commission; and
- (c) may be represented before the Commission by a legal practitioner or, with the permission of the Commission, by any other person."

Effect of section 6. Commissions of Inquiry.

3. Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, reproduced above, relates to the use of a statement against the very person who made that statement. This section obviously has no application to the use of a statement made by a deceased person in civil or criminal proceedings against another person.

Section 32, Evidence Act.

4. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act makes statements by a deceased person relevant and admissible in subsequent court proceedings. The statements mentioned in the section, however, are of special nature, like those relating to the cause of death of a person making the statement. The statements of deceased persons with which we are concerned do not belong to that category or nature.

Evidence plicability.

5. Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act makes evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before any person Act—Condi-authorised by law to take it, relevant in a subsequent judicial tions for ap-proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, to prove the truth of facts which it states when the witness is dead and in certain other contingencies with which we are not concerned. Before, however, the provisions of section 33 can be invoked, it has to be shown that the case falls within the ambit of the proviso to section 33, according to which it is essential that the earlier proceeding in which the statement was given by the witness was between the same parties or their representatives in interest, that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the witness and that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as well as the second proceeding.

6. No individuals are arrayed as formal parties in proceed-Section 33 ings before a Commission appointed under the Commissions of how far ap-Inquiry Act and no findings recorded by a Commission can be plicable—Nature of enforced proprio vigore. As the law stands at present, conse-proceedings quently a statement made by a deceased witness in proceedings before Comunder the Commissions of Inquiry Act cannot be used against missions of another person in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings. The Inquiry, question which needs consideration is as to whether as a result of amendment such a statement can be made admissible.

On general principles the Law Commission is against the use of such a statement in the course of subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, except in one limited contingency. In case a Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act has proceeded under section 8B of that Act because it considered it necessary to inquire into the conduct of a person or because it was of the opinion that the reputation of that person was likely to be prejudicially affected by that inquiry and if, further, that person has had the right and has been afforded all reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deceased witness as contemplated by section 8C and, further also, if the questions in issue before the Commission were substantially the same as at the subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, in such an event there appears to be no objection to making suitable amendment in law to make the statement of the deceased witness relevant and admissible at the subsequent civil or criminal proceedings against that person. Apart from this limited contingency, the Commission is not in favour of any proposal for making such a statement admissible by amendment of law.

7. We may now set out the reasons in support of our view. Reasons for One of the cardinal rules of the system of jurisprudence follow-the view ed by us is that a witness who deposes against a party must be taken, brought face to face with that party, so that that party may be in a position to cross-examine that witness. The safeguard is described by Bentham¹ as "confrontation". The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining of immediate answers. There is also a secondary advantage to be obtained by a personal appearance of the witness. The judge is enabled to watch the demeanour of the witness. The principle underlying section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act is that when a statement has already been subjected to cross-examination and is hence admitted, it comes in because the rule is satisfied and not because an exception to the rule is allowed. The statement may have been made before the subsequent trial, but it has already been subjected to proper cross-examination. The principle underlying section 33

¹Bentham's Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Book III, Ch. XIX, cited by Woodroffe & Ameer Ali, Law of Evidence, 12th Edition (1968) Vol. 4, page 775.

has been summed up by Woodroffe and Ameer Ali' and the same reads as under:—

"The rule contained in this section is an administrative expedient for doing justice between litigants in a particular situation as a rational compromise between two well-known canons of judicial administration. A presiding judge will require that a party furnish evidence of the primary grade, if it is within his power to do so. So long, therefore, as the proponent can reasonably be required to cause a witness to repeat to a tribunal his evidence regarding admissible facts given on a former occasion, the presiding Judge will insist that the witness himself be produced. In other words, primary evidence will be insisted on until a satisfactory forensic necessity for offering secondary evidence is brought to the attention of the tribunal. At this point, a second administrative canon, yet non-fundamental comes into operation. It is the administrative duty of the court to protect the substantive right of the party to prove his contention, so far, at least, as is reasonably within his power. When the proponent's necessity for producing a secondary grade of evidence is established, the right to submit it will be recognised by the court. The general rule is that the best evidence must be given: no evidence will be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence is attainable. Thus, depositions are in general admissible only after proof that the parties who made them cannot themselves be produced. The present section states the circumstances under which secondary evidence of oral testimony may be given. Under these circumstances, the production of primary evidence is either wholly (as if the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable, or is kept away) or partially (as in the case of delay or expense), out of the party's power."

The reasons which led to the enactment of section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, in our opinion, would hold equally good, in the one limited continued to the enactment of section 33 of the

in the one limited contingency referred to above.

Same principle applicable to of inquiries on oath under other statutory provisions, whereable to other statutory in-

ciple appli- O cable to u other sta- ci tutory inquiries on oath with right to cross-exami-

Earlier Re9. It may, incidentally, be mentioned here that while the ports of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and the Indian Evidence Act, Law Com-1872 have both been reviewed by earlier Law Commission²⁻³, the point now under consideration has not been raised so far, and the Law Commission has not therefore had any occasion to consider it.

Inquiry Act, 1952).

*69th Report of the Law Commission of India (Indian Evidence Act, 1872).

Woodroffe and Ameer Ali, Law of Evidence, 12th Edition (1968), Vol. 4, page 776.
24th Report of the Law Commission of India (Commissions of

(Sd.) (H. R. KHANNA)

H. R. KHANNA Chairman

(Sd.)

S. N. Shankar Member

(Sd.)

T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer Member

(Sd.)

P. M. Bakshi Member-Secretary

New Delhi,

Dated the 8th August, 1978.