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In this case of Madhusudan Bhanuprasad Pandya Versus State of Gujarat & Ors, The appeal arises from a judgment and order dated 24 January 2013 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat, affirming the dismissal of a Writ Petition by the Single Judge. On 7 July 2005, the Single Judge dismissed a Writ Petition filed by the appellant seeking to set aside an order of the State Government rejecting an application for exemption under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976.
In this case thhe appellant claims to be engaged in the business of manufacturing cement pipes through M/s General Cement Pipe Company Limited3 on land bearing Survey No 288/4 admeasuring 5160 sq m situated at village Chandlodia, Taluka City District, Ahmedabad. The appellant claims leasehold rights in the land under a rent note dated 27 March= 1975. Upon the enactment of the Act of 1976 on 12 September 1976, Form I underSection 6(1) was submitted on behalf of the Company, declaring that the land was leased from the original owners. Village form No 7/12 contained an entry for the years 1979-80 and 1980-81 to the effect that the land had been put to non-agricultural use without permission.
As a result, by virtue of the provisions of Section 2(q), the land upon which construction had been put up was liable to be considered as vacant land. On 26 November 1982, a draft statement under Section 8(1) was issued. On 26 August 1985, the competent authority under Section 8(4) declared land measuring 4160 sq m as excess vacant land. On 17 September 1985, a final statement was issued under Section 9. A notification under Section 10(1) was published on 31 January 1986. This was followed by a notification under Section 10(3) on 6 December 1986. A notice under Section 10(5) was issued on 6 March 1987. On 6 July 1990, the competent authority issued a notice under Section 10(6) intimating that possession of the excess land would be taken over.
At this stage, on 19 July 1990, the appellant filed an application for exemption under Section 20. According to the appellant, on 23 July 1990, the Company instituted a “Company” suit before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad in which an order of status quo was granted on the same day. The case of the appellant is that on 24 July 1990, possession of the excess land was purported to be taken over under a valid panchnama, inspite of the order of the Civil Court. On 20 July 1990, the order of the competent authority dated 26 August 1985 declaring the land as excess vacant land was challenged in an appeal under Section 33 before the Urban Land Tribunal. On 31 December 1990, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the delay of over four years had not been satisfactorily explained. On 1 September 1992, an order was passed under Section 11 in the matter of compensation.
On 3 March 1998, Special Civil Application6 No 1584 of 1998 was filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Gujarat, By an order dated 3 July 1998, the High Court disposed of the above SCA with a direction to the State Government to expeditiously decide the appellant’s application under Section 20. On 5 October 1998, the application under Section 20 was rejected in view of the fact that the land had vested in the State. Thereupon, the appellant filed another Writ Petition being SCA No 9057 of 1998 challenging the rejection of the application under Section 20. The supreme court after hearing the case held “The appellant has not placed in issue either the order of vesting or the consequences which followed under the terms of the Act of 1976. Once we have come to the conclusion that possession was taken over prior to the date of repeal i.e. 31 March 1999, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Though the petitioner in this Special Leave Petition was not a party to the proceedings before the Single Judge, it did not question the correctness of the order of the Single Judge and merely got itself impleaded as a respondent to the Letters Patent Appeal. We have already dealt with the merits of the challenge and have found no substance therein. For the above reasons, we see no merit in the Special Leave Petition. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.”
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