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A writ petition was filed by the petitioner in this case of Rana Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. NCT of Delhi &Ors., challenging the legality of a notification issued by the Government of NCT of Delhi. In that notice, provisions were made for transport vehicles i.e. the vehicles have to be equipped with speed governors of the specifications set out.
The notice was issued in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 118(2) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rule, 1989, and Section 2(41) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
The petitioner is a dealer in motor vehicles and runs his organization named ‘Rana Motors Pvt. Ltd.’, where he deals with motor vehicles particularly those manufactured by Maruti Suzuki India Limited. He deals with various models of light good vehicles such as Maruti Suzuki Omni, Cargo, EECO Cargo, Super Carry, etc.
Due to the issuance of the above notification, he is not able to get them registered in Delhi because of the restrictions imposed by the Government. According to the notification, “the vehicles ought to be verified and testified by an authorized testing agency to have an evaluated speed of not more than 80 kilometers per hour (kmph)”.
It was submitted by the Counsel on behalf of the petitioner that the provision of notification which deals with the vehicles registered on or after 1st October 2015 ultra vires the powers of Government of NCT of Delhi because Rule 118(2) empowers the State Government to issue a notification in respect of vehicles registered before 1st October 2015 and this notification was issued on 17th August 2018 i.e. almost three years after the date fixed in this standard.
Also, the power under Rule 118(2) is only in respect of those vehicles, which are not covered under the first proviso to Rule 118(1), whereas the light good vehicles in which the petitioner deals are covered under the clause in which they have been verified and certified by a testing agency specified in Rule 126 to have a maximum rated speed of not more than 80 kmph.
It was contended by the Counsel on behalf of GNCTD, that it was directed by the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta Case to the authorities ensuring that the concerned vehicles were fitted with speed governors with a pre-set speed limit of kmph. He further presented that here the intention of the Supreme Court was not to fix a particular speed limit in interminability but for the directions given in the judgment to hold the field until the executive filled the lacuna.
Observations and Conclusions of the Court:
It was observed by the Court that the counsel on behalf of GNCTD seeks justification not based on Rule 118(2) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rule, 1989 but the judgment of the Supreme Court in the M.C. Mehta Case. However, the M.C. Mehta case is the only proviso to Rule 118(1) which helps in identifying the class of vehicles to which it applies and not a source of power that will apply such restriction.
The Court is of the view that it is settled law that an executive order cannot be defended on grounds which are not borne out of the record, but sought to be urged during litigation, by way of affidavit or otherwise(Mohinder Singh Gill &Anr. V. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, (1978) 1 SCC 405).
However, it is also a settled position that an act of public authority cannot be invalidated merely because a wrong provision or section was cited as the source of authority(P.K Palanisamy v. N. Arumugham&Anr., (2009) 9 SCC 173). Therefore, in this case, the contentions of respondents are examined both based on counter-affidavits and arguments advanced by the learned Standing counsel.
In consideration to the notification ultra vires Rule 118 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rule, 1989, it was observed by the court that the power conferred under Rule 118(2) is expressly limited to the issuance of a notification in respect of transport vehicles registered before 1st October 2015 and Rule 118(1) deals with the requirement for installation of speed governors for said registered vehicles.
These orders are a matter of paramount public safety and therefore, are evidently within the ambit of Article 21. However, the judgment of M.C Mehta does not confer the power upon the State Government to issue the impugned notification because it was expressly cleared that directions issued by the Supreme Court in the judgment were intended to affect until the executive acted to fill the lacuna.
Though, the judgment in M.C Mehta does not hold that the State Government has nothing to do with speed governors because it was once held that the State Governments are also bound to guarantee road safety and to that end, they are required to ensure the fitment of speed governors to be of good quality. However, “it does not confer an independent power upon the State Government to prescribe a speed limit which is at variance with the mandate of the Rules framed by the Union of India.”
Hence, it is concluded that the writ petition of the petitioner is allowed and the provisions of the above rule are neither referable to the powers vested in the hands of the Government of NCT of Delhi nor to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the M.C. Mehta case and therefore, the notification dates 17th August, 2018 which deals with vehicles registered on or after 1st October, 2015 is ultra vires the powers of the Government of NCT of Delhi and hence, quashed.
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