IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 05.01.2021

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R. SURESH KUMAR

W.P. No. 977 of 2007

K.Saravana Babu ... Petitioner

-vs-

1. Inspector General,
   Armed Police, Lotus Garden,
   Kilpauk, Chennai - 10.

2. Commandant,
   Tamil Nadu Special Police,
   VI Battalion,
   Madurai.

3. Deputy Inspector General of Police,
   Armed Police (M&W),
   Tiruchy. ... Respondents

PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the third respondent in C. No. A2/Appeal 30/99 dated 10.08.1999 quash the same pass an order reinstating the applicant in service.

For Petitioner : Mr.R.Singgaravelan
Senior Counsel
for M/s.S.F.Mohamed Yousuf

For Respondents : Mr.K.Mahesh
Special Government Pleader

ORDER

The petitioner herein filed an Original Application in O.A. No. 4752 of 1999 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench, challenging the order of enhanced punishment awarded by the third respondent, removing the petitioner from service, by order dated 10.08.1999. The said O.A. stood transferred to this Court, in view of the abolition of the Administrative Tribunal and accordingly has been renumbered as W.P. No. 977 of 2007. Therefore, the prayer sought for in this Writ Petition, as has been couched in the said O.A. is for a certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the third respondent in C.No.A2/Appeal 30/99 dated 10.08.1999 quash the same and to pass an order reinstating the applicant i.e., the petitioner herein into service.

2. The short facts which are required to be noticed for disposal of this Writ Petition are as follows:

(i) That the petitioner was appointed as a Police Constable in the Armed Reserve Police during 1997 and when he had been working as such with the respondents, he was placed under suspension, by order dated 12.10.1998 by the second respondent and subsequently, the second respondent issued a charge memo, against the petitioner, dated 18.11.1998 framing charges under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1955.

(ii) The sum and substance of the charge is that, on 10.10.1998, at about 7.30 a.m., a woman constable namely Bhuvaneswari attached to the Tamil Nadu Special Police, VI Battalion, 'D' Company, entered into the quarters allotted to the petitioner with the intention to have illicit intimacy, that the door of the quarters was made to be closed from inside and that the petitioner had been in the quarters along with the woman constable Bhuvaneswari till the authorities came and made open the door by knocking the door and by thus committed such, condemnable act.

(iii) The original charge which is in vernacular (Tamil) framed against the petitioner reads thus:

"10.10.1998 அன்று காலை சுமார் 07.30 மணியளவில் உமக்கு ஒதுக்கப்பட்ட தமிழ்நாடு சிறப்புக்காவல் 6ம் அணி அரசு குடியிருப்பு ஜெ 1–ல் நீவிர் இருந்த சமயம், தமிழ்நாடு சிறப்புக்காவல் 6ம் அணி டி நிறுமத்தைச் சேர்ந்த பெண் காவலர் 4217 புவனேஸ்வரி என்பவர், உமது குடியிருப்பினுள் நுழைந்து உம்முடன் தகாத உறவு கொள்ளும் எண்ணத்துடன் அக்குடியிருப்பின் கதவை உட்புறமாகத் தாளிட அனுமதித்ததும், அதிகாரிகள் உமது குடியிருப்புக்கு வந்து கதவை தட்டி திறக்கச் செய்யும்வரை அப்பெண் ணுடன் அக்குடியிருப்பினுள் தங்கியிருந்ததுமான மிகவும் ஒழுங்கீனமானதும் கண்டிக்கத்தக்கதுமான நடத்தை."

(iv) Pursuant to the said charge, the disciplinary proceeding was initiated, whereby, enquiry was conducted by appointing Enquiry Officer, before whom, on behalf of the employer / department, 12 witnesses were examined. After giving due opportunity to the petitioner, the enquiry was concluded and the Enquiry Officer ultimately concluded that, the charges framed against the petitioner were proved.

(v) Pursuant to the Enquiry Officer's report, the second respondent by order dated 10.08.1999, inflicted on the petitioner, a punishment of "reduction in time scale of pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect", and financial recovery also to be made to the extant appliable, if the punishment could not be given effect to.

3. Felt aggrieved over the said punishment inflicted against the petitioner, he preferred an appeal to the first respondent, who, on considering the said appeal, issued a show cause notice dated 21.07.1999 to the petitioner, seeking show cause with regard to the proposed enhancement of punishment.

4. In response to the said show cause notice, the petitioner has given his defence / explanation and the same having been considered, the first respondent, passed the order of enhancement of punishment, by order dated 10.08.1999, whereby, the punishment originally awarded by the Disciplinary Authority i.e., the second respondent has been enhanced to the major punishment of dismissal from service. Therefore,

challenging the said orders of punishment originally awarded by the second respondent and subsequent enhanced punishment of dismissal of service awarded by the first respondent / Appellate Authority, the O.A. was originally filed, which stood transferred, and renumbered as the present Writ Petition with the aforesaid prayer.

5. Heard Mr.R.Singgaravelan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, who has taken this Court extensively to the aforesaid proceedings, especially the Enquiry Officer's report. The learned Senior counsel has pointed out that, the entire episode, as has been projected by the prosecution / respondents side, was denied by the petitioner / delinquent, as no such immoral activity taken place on the particular date at the quarters, where the petitioner was residing. Merely because, a woman police constable visited the house of the petitioner, who is co-employee or co-member of the same force, it cannot be presumed by the employer that, some immoral activity had taken place inside the house and with that intention only, the woman constable entered into the house of the petitioner, thereby the petitioner / delinquent had acted with

the moral turpitude, therefore, he is liable to be punished, that too with a maximum punishment of dismissal of service and this decision taken by the respondents, especially the first respondent / Appellate Authority, cannot be supported by any materials, as this was decided only based on presumption, as none of the 12 witnesses made any statements to that effect before the Enquiry Officer that, they found both delinquent and the woman constable in any compromising position.

6. The learned Senior counsel would also point out that, if at all the action of the petitioner in permitting a co-employee, here it is a woman constable, to his house for sometime, if that action is considered to be a violation of code of conduct, which are supposed to be strictly followed by any member of the disciplined force, for such alleged violation, assuming, whether that would invite the maximum punishment of dismissal of service is the question. Therefore, in this context, the learned Senior counsel would contend that, first of all, absolutely there has been no occurrence taken place, as presumed by the department side and assuming that, the petitioner entertained the co-employee at his house,

merely because of such action, the punishment awarded both by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are untenable, in view of the facts of the case.

7. The learned Senior counsel would also canvass that, the reasoning given by the Appellate Authority for enhancing the punishment for dismissal of service is absolutely unjustifiable and therefore, certainly the impugned order is warranting interference from this Court. The learned Senior counsel would further contend that, considering the *prima facie* case only, the Administrative Tribunal, at the time of admission of the Original Application, granted interim order of stay, the same is continuing till date even during pendency of the Writ Petition, therefore, the petitioner has been continuously working in the respondents department. He would further add that, because of the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner has not been considered so far for any promotional benefits and has been still working in that category of Police Constable, i.e., initial Entry Level employment. Therefore, the learned Senior counsel would request that, the impugned

orders are liable to be interfered with and accordingly, suitable orders can be passed by this Court.

8. I have heard Mr.K.Magesh, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, who would contend that, there has been 12 witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer on behalf of the department and all those witnesses said in one voice that, on the particular date, when they found the quarters, where the petitioner was residing, was kept locked inside and only after knocking the door of the quarters, the delinquent / petitioner opened the door, the woman constables went inside, they found that, the said woman constable Bhuvaneswari was standing in the kitchen part of the quarters and this uniform statement made by all the witnesses before the Enquiry Officer, would go to show that, only with the intention to have some illicit or immoral intimacy with the woman constable, the petitioner had entertained her inside the quarters and that is why, he kept the quarters locked inside.

9. The learned Special Government Pleader would further submit that, though the said woman constable was not examined as one of the witnesses in the enquiry, however subsequently separate disciplinary proceedings was initiated against her, ultimately, she was found guilty on the same incident, hence she also was removed from service. Therefore, what was the punishment awarded to the woman constable for the very same occurrence, the petitioner is also liable to be inflicted and therefore, merely because the said woman constable was not enquired, it cannot be a fatal to the entire disciplinary proceedings which was properly conducted by the authorities, therefore, the learned Special Government Pleader would canvass in favour of the sustainability of the impugned order.

10. Insofar as the enhancement of the punishment to the extent of dismissal of service of the petitioner is concerned, the learned Special Government Pleader would submit that, since the police force is a disciplined force and every member of the disciplined force is expected to maintain utmost morality and integrity, and if there is any small iota of

violation in integrity as well as morality, such member of the disciplined force is liable to be inflicted with the maximum punishment, which is permissible under the relevant rule and therefore, it cannot be questioned that, the enhanced punishment inflicted against the petitioner is not incommensurate and not has been inflicted based on the evidences.

11. Therefore, the learned Special Government Pleader would submit that, the impugned order of both the original punishment as well as the enhanced punishment have been passed inflicting such punishment only on appreciating the recorded evidences on behalf of the department against the petitioner and therefore, such orders cannot be said to be unlawful or unsustainable or arbitrary and also cannot be said to be the orders passed without any evidence, therefore, both the orders impugned are sustainable, he contended.

12. I have considered the said rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the materials placed before this Court.

13. The actual charge framed against the petitioner has already been quoted herein above. In respect of the charge, the stand of the petitioner, which has been stated by him in the reply given to the charge reads as follows:

"3 .நான் த.சி.கா. 6 ம் அணியில் வாகனப் பிரிவில் ஒட்டுநர் காவலராக பணிபுரிந்து வருகிறேன். 7.10.1998 அன்று பண்டக அலுவலராக சென்னை சென்றுவிட்டு 10.10.1998 அன்று காலை 08.30 மணியளவில் என் வீட்டில் குளித்துக் கொண்டிருந்தேன். அப்பொழுது வீட்டின் கதவு தட்டப்படும் ஓசை கேட்டது. பின்பு வந்து கதவை திறந்தேன். அப்பொழுது பெண் காவலர் புவனேஸ்வரி என்பவர் என் வீட்டில் நின்று கொண்டிருந்தார். அவரிடம் வந்து சற்று இருங்கள். துணி மாற்றிவிட்டு வருகிறேன் என்று எனது வீட்டின் உள்ளறைக்குச் சென்று துணி மாற்றிக்கொண்டு விட்டு பெண் காவலரிடம் வந்து என்னவென்று கேட்டேன். அவருடைய தோழி மங்களேஸ்வரி என்பவரை பார்க்க வந்தேன். அவள் வீடு பூட்டியிருந்தது. என்னிடம் சாவி கொடுத்தார்களா என்று கேட்டார்கள். அவர்கள் வழக்கமாக வீட்டை பூட்டி வெளியே செல்லும்போது என்னிடம் சாவியை கொடுப்பது வழக்கம். ஆனால் அன்று என்னிடம் சாவி ஏதும் கொடுக்கவில்லை என்று கூறினேன். அப்போது என் வீட்டின் முன்கதவு

திடீரென்று சாத்தப்பட்டு பூட்டு போடப்பட்டது போல் இருந்தது. சிறிது நேரம் கழித்து உதவி தளவாய் 1 மற்றும் 3 ஆகியோர்கள் அங்கு வந்து கதவை திறந்தார்கள். நான் அவர்களிடம் வேண்டுமென்றே கதவைப் பூட்டி எனக்கு கெட்ட பெயரை ஏற்படுத்தியுள்ளார்கள் என்று புகார் கூறினேன். இது தான் அன்று நடந்த உண்மை சம்பவமாகும். எனக்கும் அந்த பெண் காவலருக்கும் எந்தவித தொடர்பும் இல்லை. 10.10.1998 அன்று நான் குற்றச்சாட்டு குறிப்பாணையில் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது போல் அவருடன் தகாத உறவு கொள்ளும் எண்ணத்துடன் எனது குடியிருப்பின் கதவை உள்புறமாக தாளிட அனுமதிக்கவில்லை. நான் இந்தக் குற்றச்சாட்டை முற்றிலும் மறுக்கிறேன்."

14. From the said admitted facts on behalf of the petitioner, it can easily be ascertained that, on the particular date, i.e, on 10.10.1998, during the morning hours, between 7.30 a.m. to 8.30 a.m., the woman constable one Bhuvaneswari visited the house of the petitioner and the reason for visiting the petitioner house has been explained by the petitioner in the aforesaid statement. The Enquiry Officer, based on this charge as well as the statement given by the petitioner, had enquired the 12 persons / 12 witnesses on behalf of the employer / department and all

these witnesses, as has been pointed out by the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, has stated before the Enquiry Officer that, on the particular date, at the time between 7.30 a.m. to 8.30 a.m., they found that, the quarters, where the petitioner was residing, was found locked inside.

15. It is also to be noted that, some of the witnesses also stated that, they found the door was also kept locked from outside, after opening the outside lock, they knocked the door, they also found that, they kept locked inside and after hearing the knocking sound, the petitioner has come and opened the door.

16. Thereafter, the witnesses stated that, some of the women Police personnels, who are also the witnesses, went inside the house and they found that, the women constable concerned was standing in the kitchen portion of the house. It is pertinent to be noted that, none of the witnesses deposed, saying that, they found the women constable in any compromising position.

17. Therefore, what has been stated in the statement by way of admission by the petitioner alone has been reiterated by the witnesses i.e., all the 12 witnesses enquired on behalf of the respondents. Nothing beyond admitted by the petitioner, was found by the Enquiry Officer from the evidences of the witnesses, which is available before this Court.

18. Based on these available records, materials or evidences, the second respondent / Disciplinary Authority had come to the conclusion that, the petitioner, only with the intention of having some illicit intimacy with the woman constable, had permitted her inside of the quarters and kept the door of the quarters locked inside and accordingly, he awarded the punishment of cut in increment of three years with cumulative effect.

19. Pausing for a moment, insofar as the said punishment of the Disciplinary Authority is concerned, it was mainly on the morality which is expected from the member of the disciplined force. It is also to be noted that, before the said incident, there was no complaint that, the

petitioner was in violation of morality, which he has to follow strictly. This was the first time, the employer's side found this incident, which, according to the eye witnesses, cannot be suggested to an immoral or illicit act.

20. Assuming that, the petitioner had allowed the co-employee being a woman-folk at his residing place, it cannot be automatically presumed that, such an entertainment of an opposite sex co-employee is only for an immoral or illicit activities. Unless they have a strong and concrete evidence to suggest that the illicit or immoral activities had taken place, merely on the basis of presumption or surmises, one cannot come to a conclusion that, since they were in one roof for some time, it is only for illegal activities. This kind of presumption alone in the society cannot be a basis for arriving at a conclusion as arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority, that too for inflicting the punishment against the employee, working under him.

21. In this context, the learned Senior counsel relied upon the decision reported in ***AIR 1978 SC 1277*** in the matter of ***Nand Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar and others***, where he relied upon the following passages:

> *"Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the impugned orders are based merely on suspicions and conjectures, and not on any evidence whatever, and as such, are bad in law. It is submitted that the High Court had over-stepped its writ jurisdiction inasmuch as it reappraised the evidence, and reconstructed the case as if it were itself a domestic tribunal, reviewing in appeal the orders of the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue.*
>
> *As against this, counsel for the respondent submits that the High Court had examined the evidence on the record of the domestic tribunal, not to make out a new case, but to satisfy itself that the impugned orders were based on circumstantial evidence which had been cryptically alluded to by the Commissioner and more elaborately mentioned by the Member of the Board of Revenue in the impugned order.*

Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, we may remind ourselves of the principles, in point, crystallised by judicial decisions. The first of these principles is that disciplinary proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of a quasi-judicial character; therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence, i.e. evidential material which with some degree if definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries. As pointed out by this Court in Union of India v. H. C. Goel(1), the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules." The second principle, which is a corollary from the first, is, that if the disciplinary inquiry has been conducted fairly without bias or predilection, in accordance with the relevant disciplinary rules on the Constitutional

provisions, the order passed by such authority cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, merely on the ground that it was based on evidence which would be insufficient for conviction of the delinquent on the same charge at a criminal trial. The contentions in the instant case resolve into the narrow issue : Whether the impugned orders do not rest on any evidence whatever", but merely on suspicions, conjectures and surmises."

22. He also relied upon another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***(2009) 2 SCC 570*** in the matter of ***Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others***, wherein it has been held as follows:

"14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer

against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.

15. We have noticed herein before that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The Appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the

offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.

16. In Union of India vs. H.S. Goel, it was held:(AIR pp.369-70, paras 22-23)

"22. ....The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bonafide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting malafide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of malafides, but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issued without further proof of malafides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney-General's argument that sine no malafides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent.

23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant

that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondents case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at

all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in question is proved against the respondent ? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well-founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence."

17. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p.492, para 17)

"17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring

commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely - preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality."

"23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the

order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof."

23. Moreover, it is a settled proposition that, based on mere supposition and conjectures, a categorical finding cannot be given and conclusion cannot be reached against the employee, that too for the inflictment of the maximum punishment of dismissal of service.

24. In the departmental proceedings, as the decree of proof is preponderance of probability, there need not be a proof in the strict sense of proof beyond the reasonable doubt as envisaged in criminal proceedings. In departmental proceedings, the authorities should come to the conclusion that, the delinquent has violated the code of conduct only based on the documentary as well as the oral evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Even for such a mere preponderance probability, there must be a straight and clear evidence.

25. Here in the case in hand, though 12 witnesses were examined, none of them had stated that, the woman constable was found in compromising position. Therefore, this is the case, which can be brought under the category of suspicion and conjectures.

26. Therefore, based on such suspicion and conjectures, one cannot come to a conclusion that, some unlawful or immoral activities taken place and by virtue of that, the employee / delinquent is liable to be punished with a maximum punishment of dismissal of service. These

aspects have not been considered in proper perspective both by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, as they have simply presumed that illicit or immoral activity was taken place and accordingly, they decided to impose the punishment as has been inflicted in the impugned order.

27. However, this Court after having perused all these materials, found that, under the judicial scrutiny, the said method adopted by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority cannot be appreciated and if such method adopted now by these authorities are accepted by this Court and sustained the impugned orders of punishment, that would lead to disastrous consequence on many issues. Therefore, this Court having no other option, interfere with the impugned order.

28. In the result, both the impugned orders i.e., orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, dated 10.03.1999 as well as the Appellate Authority dated 10.08.1999 are hereby quashed. As a sequel, the petitioner shall be entitled to get service benefits which are available to

him under the relevant service rules. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed as indicated above. However, there shall be no order as to cost.

05.01.2021

Index: Yes

Speaking Order: Yes

vji

To

1. The Inspector General,
   Armed Police, Lotus Garden,
   Kilpauk, Chennai - 10.

2. The Commandant,
   Tamil Nadu Special Police,
   VI Battalion,
   Madurai.

3. The Deputy Inspector General of Police,
   Armed Police (M&W),
   Tiruchy.

R. SURESH KUMAR, J.

vji

W.P. No. 977 of 2007

05.01.2021