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A Division Bench of the Supreme Court has referred to a larger Bench a case to decide whether the proviso to Section 24 applies to Section 24(1)(b) or Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Land Acquisition Act 2013).
In 2018, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the case Delhi Metro Rail Corporation v. Tarun Pal Singh held that proviso to Section 24 governs Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b). The judgment held that sub-section (2) of Section 24 to apply: (i) the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act should have been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act; and (ii) physical possession of the land should not have been taken or compensation should not have been paid.
A bench of Justices Rohinton Nariman and Vineet Saran decided that the above judgment would require reconsideration. The case of Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra deals with different aspects of Section 24 and had already been referred to a Constitution Bench. Hence the Court added that the judgment in Tarun Pal Singh should be considered by the same Bench.
The Chief Justice of India was requested to refer DMRC v. Tarun Pal Singh to the larger bench which is hearing Indore Development Authority.
The Delhi High Court by its judgment in 2015 in Tarun Pal Singh v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT of Delhi held that the proviso would govern Section 24(1)(b), and not Section 24(2). It was followed in a number of later judgments of the same High Court. A Division Bench of the Supreme Court in 2018 in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation v. Tarun Pal Singh took the view that the proviso to Section 24 governs Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b). The case an appeal filed against a Delhi High Court judgment.
The Delhi Development Authority through Senior Counsel Amarendra Sharan argued that as Delhi Metro Rail Corporation v. Tarun Pal Singh is a very recent judgment of the Supreme Court, it must not be disturbed as it has correctly appreciated and settled the law in great detail. However, Dhruv Mehta, Senior Advocate representing respondents contended that the judgment in the instant case requires reconsideration and if the proviso to Section 24 were to govern Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b), a valuable right of lapsing would be eliminated and various inconsistencies would appear.
Section 24(1) deals with compensation whereas Section 24(2) deals with lapsing of the acquisition itself. Section 24 of the Act deals with situations where the land acquisition process initiated under the previous Act is deemed to have been lapsed. The compensation is payable not under the provisions of the repealed Act, but under the 2013 Act if the circumstances permit.
Several judgments of the Supreme Court has declared that a proviso cannot be used to nullify the substantive provision of the main enactment. If the proviso is read with Section 24(2), then arbitrary results would arise and the proviso would be liable to be struck down for breach of Article 14 of the Constitution.
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