The Validity of Arbitration Agreements Post Decree No. 34/2021: A Critical Examination of Narcisco v. Nash
Introduction:
In Narcisco v. Nash (ARB 009/2024), the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Court of First Instance (CFI) was tasked with assessing the enforceability of an arbitration agreement that provided for arbitration under the now-defunct DIFC-London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules. This case arose against Decree No. 34/2021, which abolished the DIFC-LCIA and transferred its arbitration functions to the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC). The ruling by Michael Black KC in Narcisco v. Nash endorsed the enforceability of such agreements, upholding the provisions of Decree No. 34/2021.
Impact of Decree No. 34/2021:
Decree No. 34/2021 resulted in the dissolution of the DIFC-LCIA and mandated that DIAC administer all agreements referencing the DIFC-LCIA under the 2022 DIAC Rules. This sparked controversy, as substituting arbitral institutions without party consent raised concerns about party autonomy, a cornerstone of international arbitration. Previous rulings by courts in the United States and Singapore had held that defaulting to a different arbitral institution violated party autonomy, thereby rendering such agreements invalid.
Black KC’s Rationale:
In Narcisco v. Nash, Black KC rejected the findings of these foreign courts, aligning instead with the Abu Dhabi Court’s reasoning in Vaned Engineering GmBH v. Reem Hospital. He ruled that Decree No. 34/2021 did not violate party autonomy, as it allowed parties to agree to an alternative arbitral institution. Furthermore, he emphasized that the decree simply substituted one institution for another without altering the fundamental agreement to arbitrate.
Black KC reasoned that the termination of the DIFC-LCIA did not invalidate arbitration agreements referring to it, as the parties could have opted for the LCIA itself, which had substantially similar rules to the DIFC-LCIA. He underscored the pro-arbitration stance of UAE law and DIFC courts, asserting that the decree aimed to preserve the enforceability of arbitration agreements rather than undermine party autonomy.
Analysis of Party Autonomy:
While Black KC’s decision was based on upholding the contractual obligation to arbitrate, critics argue that the decree undermines the essence of party autonomy. Arbitration, as a creature of contract, is rooted in the parties' mutual consent. By forcing parties to arbitrate under DIAC—an institution they did not expressly choose—Decree No. 34/2021 introduces an element of compulsion that contradicts the consensual nature of arbitration.
Additionally, the argument that parties could have contracted into LCIA arbitration does not fully address situations where one party may be unwilling to modify the forum post-dispute, leading to tactical deadlocks. This weakens the safeguard that Decree No. 34/2021 purportedly provides.
Conclusion:
The ruling in Narcisco v. Nash affirms the validity of arbitration agreements under Decree No. 34/2021, emphasizing a pro-arbitration approach while preserving party autonomy. However, the enforceability of agreements under such a decree raises questions about the true scope of party consent when arbitral institutions are unilaterally replaced. While the DIFC CFI ruling brings clarity to the legal landscape, it remains to be seen how parties will navigate forum selection challenges under the new regime.
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