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Judgement Analysis: Vikram Singh v Union of India
Bench: Justice T.S. Thakur, Justice R.K. Agrawal and Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel
Background: The present writ petition arises from two convicts sentenced to death for offences committed under Section 302 and 364A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and affirmed by the High Court in 2008. But an appeal was sought on this behalf to contest his conviction and a writ petition to contest the constitutionality of section 364A of IPC which was accordingly rejected. The appellants then took recourse to the Supreme Court to decide over the matter which referred it to the higher bench for consideration.
Issues: The issues raised before the court were
- Whether the punishment under section 364A be withheld if the ransom was sought from a private individual? If that is the case then what was the need to introduce a different provision instead of amending the original one?
- Whether Section 364A stands ultra vires the Constitution as it takes away the judicial discretion over punishment with very limited sense?
Arguments from the petitioner: The counsel for the petitioner contended that the Section 364A of the IPC was attracted only in situations where an offence was committed against the Government, foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation. There could not be any application of the provision over the convicts asking ransom from the private individuals. The primary intent of the legislation was to use it against the terrorists who take hostages with the intent of compelling the Government or a foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation to do or abstain from doing any act including payment of ransom.
The other argument was based on the contention that the provision only entitles the convict to either life imprisonment or death which violates Article 21, right to life. The same contention was also accepted in the case of Mithu etc. v. State of Punjab etc. (1983) 2 SCC 277 wherein a similar provision which sought denial of judicial discretion over the punishment by prescribing only the death punishment, was held to be ultra vires the Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
Arguments from the respondents: The counsel for the respondents submitted that the contention over the reduction of punishment from the death sentence was rightfully adjudicated upon in various previous appeals and the further argumentation will be wastage of time. Further, he referred to the previous appeal judgement of High Court which also discussed the issue of the intent of the legislature to limit section 364A to terrorists at large with reference to the historical background but didn’t find the petitioner’s arguments sustainable.
The counsel levelled its argument over the issue of unconstitutionality by distinguishing the provision in question in Mithu’s case from the present case than in the former one i.e., section 303, IPC as the only punishment possible was death punishment while in section 364A that is not the case. Also, the present case deals with the offences of grave nature and therefore there was a need for such punishment and gave the option of life imprisonment or death depending upon the graveness of offence. Further, it was contended that the present case is a Criminal appeal ousts the jurisdiction of the court from the current contention over unconstitutionality.
Judgement: The bench primarily rejected the contention over the non-application of the section 364A in the current matter with the reasoning that the contention was held invalid a certain number of times in previous appeals as there lies no ground for further consideration over the issue until the rejection of the previous appeal stands good while taking reference from the judgement in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 388.
Over the issue of the scope of Section 364A, the reference was taken from the 42nd Report by the Law Commission of India which recommended the addition of the provision. The chronological summary indicates that primarily the intent of provision recommended by the report was to give aggravated punishment and response to the concerned crime already in existence and not with the concern of different crime but the amendment bought was different but sought same intent as could be understood in the ‘object’ clause. Further, it was again amended which substituted the words ‘any other person’ which referred to the person from whom the ransom was demanded by the words “any foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation or any other person” because India acceded to the international convention at United Nations General Assembly against the crime of taking international hostages with intent to compel other nation or organisation to do or abstain from doing something or to spread terrorism. While considering the present order of amendments it can be inferred that the intent of the legislature was to include the scope of terrorism which involves the cases of abduction and ransom to the provision and not to limit it to just the terrorists. The court held that Section 364A will cover even cases where the demand for ransom is made not as a part of any terrorist act but also for monetary gain from a private individual. The court, therefore, laid down a distinction between section 383 and 364A that in the latter one the individual or organisation or foreign nation is compelled to do some act or abstinence which is in addition to just monetary benefits in the former one.
However, the issue of unconstitutionality of section 364A over lack of judicial discretion, the court disregarded the contention solely on the basis that the cases don’t stand similar hence the contention on the basis of that case won’t hold good. The court while referring to the judgement in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 107 held that legislation is presumed to be constitutionally valid with the burden of showing the contrary lying heavily upon anyone who challenges its validity. It further held that prescribing the punishments is the work of the legislature and not the judiciary. Courts have to decide the proportionality of the same after taking due consideration of facts. However, the courts can interfere if the prescribed punishment is outrageously disproportionate to the offence or so inhuman or brutal that the same cannot be accepted by any standard of decency.
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