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Case Analysis: Sowmithri Vishnu vs Union of India
PETITIONER: SMT. SOWMITHRI VISHNU
RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:27/05/1985
BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ,PATHAK, R.S.SEN, AMARENDRA NATH
INTRODUCTION
Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 makes adultery a criminal offence by imposing culpability on a man who has sexual intercourse with another man’s wife. In this case, Soumithri Vishnu had approached the apex court under Article 32 of the Constitution praying to quash the complaint, lodged by her husband against Dharma Ebenezer under section 497 of IPC for the offence of adultery with her wife, on the ground that the very provision is violative of Article 14, 15 and Article 21 and hence it is constitutionally void. As in the earlier cases, the Court stated that Section 497 does not offend Article 14, 15 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the petition, quashed the complaint lodged by petitioner’s husband against Dharma Ebenezer and held that Section 497 does not offend Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
FACTS
It was stated that the petitioner filed a petition for divorce against her husband, J. Vishnu Naidu on the ground of desertion. But the trial court dismissed that petition of the petitioner and held that the petitioner had herself left her husband and not the other way about.
Thereafter, the husband filed a petition for divorce against her wife on the ground that his wife had deserted him and that she was living in adultery with a person called Dharma Ebenezer. e wife conceded therein petition that insight of the finding recorded within the earlier proceeding that she had deserted her husband, a decree for divorce was also passed against her on account of desertion. But she contended further that the Court shouldn't adjudicate upon the question of adultery since it absolutely was unnecessary to try and do so. That plea of the respondent was opposed by the husband and it had been contended by the husband that he was entitled to get a decree of divorce against the petitioner/wife not only on the bottom of desertion but also on the bottom of adultery which, there was no reason why he should be denied a chance to point out that the petitioner/wife was living in adultery. The contention of the husband was accepted by the court but, during a revision application filed by the petitioner, the bench accepted the plea of the petitioner and held that since the finding recorded within the earlier petition was binding on the parties, a decree for divorce had to be passed in favour of the husband on account of desertion which, it had been unnecessary to investigate the question of adultery. We are informed at the Bar that, under the High Court's view, a decree for divorce has already been passed in favour of the husband on the bottom that the wife had deserted her husband.
While the petition of a husband for divorce was pending, he filed a complaint against Dharma Ebenezer under section 497 of the IPC charging him with having committed adultery with his wife. This writ petition had been filed by the petitioner for quashing that complaint on the bottom that the very provision, section 497 of the penal code which creates the offence of 'adultery', is unconstitutional.
JUDGMENT
Hon’ble Bench of the Supreme Court of India Comprising of justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice R.S. Sen and Justice R.S.rendra Nathhese, on 27 May 1985, after hearing arguments by both the parties dismissed the petition filed by the Soumithri Vishnu held that these issues which have raised by the petitioner have emotive appeal but don't have a valid legal basis to rest upon. Taking the primary of those three grounds, the offence of adultery, by its very definition, is often committed by a person and not by a lady. The argument really involves this that the definition should be recast by extending the ambit of the offence of adultery in order that, both the person and therefore the woman should be punishable for the offence of adultery. Were such an argument permissible, several provisions of the penal law may be struck down on the bottom that, either in their definition or in their prescription of punishment, they are doing not go far enough. as an example, an argument can be advanced on why the offence of robbery should be punishable with imprisonment for ten years under section 392 of the IPC but the offence of adultery should be punishable with a sentence of a period of 5 years only: 'Breaking a matrimonial house is not less serious against the law than breaking open a house'. Such arguments visit the policy of the law, to not its constitutionality, unless, while implementing the policy, any provision of the Constitution is infringed. We cannot accept that in defining the offence of adultery so on restrict the category of offenders to men, any constitutional provision is infringed. it's commonly accepted that it's the person who is that the seducer and not the girl. This position may have undergone some change over the years but it's for the legislature to think about whether Section 497 should be amended appropriately so on observe of the 'transformation' which the society has undergone
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